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Abstract 
Various AI models are increasingly being considered as part of clinical decision-support tools. 
However, the trustworthiness of such models is rarely considered. Clinicians are more likely 
to use a model if they can understand and trust its predictions. Key to this is if its underlying 
reasoning can be explained. A Bayesian network (BN) model has the advantage that it is not a 
black-box and its reasoning can be explained. In this paper, we propose an incremental 
explanation of inference that can be applied to ‘hybrid’ BNs, i.e. those that contain both 
discrete and continuous nodes. The key questions that we answer are: (1) which important 
evidence supports or contradicts the prediction, and (2) through which intermediate variables 
does the information flow. The explanation is illustrated using a real clinical case study. A small 
evaluation study is also conducted. 
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1. Introduction 
Many clinical decision support (CDS) models have been developed in medicine [1]. However, 
very few of them have been actually used in practice to support decision making [2], [3]. 
Sometimes it is assumed that an accurate prediction is enough for making a CDS model useful, 
but this neglects the importance of trust [4], [5]. A user, who does not understand or trust a 
model, will not accept its advice [2], [5]. The lack of trust may be due to the difficulty of 
understanding how a prediction is inferred from the given data. As Aristotle wrote ‘we do not 
have knowledge of a thing until we have grasped its why, that is to say, its explanation’. Hence, 
explaining a model's reasoning, its inference, could increase trustworthiness. 
This paper considers Bayesian Networks (BNs): directed acyclic graphs, showing 
causal or influential relationships between random variables. These variables can be discrete 
or continuous, and a BN with both is called `hybrid'. The uncertain relationships between 
connected variables are expressed using conditional probabilities. The strength of these 
relationships is captured in the Node Probability Table (NPT), used to represent the 
conditional probability distribution of each node in the BN given its parents. Once values for 
all NPTs are given, the BN is fully parameterized, and probabilistic reasoning (using Bayesian 
inference) can be performed. However, the reasoning process is not always easy for a user to 
follow [6], [7], [8].  
In contrast to many CDS models, a BN is not a black box and its reasoning can be 
explained [6], [9]. Several approaches have been proposed to explain the reasoning of a BN 
(presented in Section 3). However, there are many situations where these methods cannot be 
applied. First, most of the methods are applied to BNs that include only discrete variables. 
Some of them are even restricted to binary variables only. However, most of the medical BNs 
include continuous nodes as well. In addition, most of them try to find the best explanation 
that can be time-consuming, especially for large BNs, which are common in medical 
applications. Finally, in some methods, user input is required in different stages of the 
explanation. This can be problematic, especially in situations where there is time pressure.  
In this paper, we propose a practical method of explaining the reasoning in a BN, so 
that a user can understand how a prediction is generated. The method is an extension of a 
previous conference paper published by the authors [10]. Our proposed method can be used 
in hybrid networks that have both continuous and discrete nodes and requires no user input. 
In addition, we simplify the process of identifying the most important evidence and chains of 
reasoning, so we can rapidly produce a good and concise explanation, but not necessarily the 
most complete one. In fact, our method produces an incremental explanation that has three 
successive levels of detail. The key questions that we answer are: (1) which important 
evidence supports or contradicts the prediction, and (2) through which intermediate variables 
does the information flow. A clinical case study on predicting coagulopathy in the Emergency 
Department (ED) is used to illustrate our explanation. An evaluation study of the impact that 
the explanation has on clinicians’ trust is also presented using the same case study. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents necessary background material, 
explaining how we are using the idea of explanation to increase a user’s trust in a clinical 
decision support model implemented using a BN. In particular, we contrast our objectives with 
the wider literature on ‘explanation’. Section 3 presents related works that shares our 
objectives. The proposed method is presented in Section 4. The verbal output of the 
explanation is illustrated using a real scenario in Section 5. Section 6 shows a small evaluation 
study. Discussion and conclusion are presented in Section 7 and 8, respectively. 
2. Background: Conditional Independence, Markov Blanket and 
Explanation in Bayesian Networks  
This section introduces necessary preliminaries for understanding the proposed method. First, 
a brief description of conditional independences in BNs is presented. Second, the Markov 
Blanket (MB) of a variable in a BN is defined. Finally, the different objectives of an explanation 
are described, noting how these apply in the context of BNs.  
2.1 Conditional Independence 
Two variables A and B are independent, usually written as 𝐴 ⊥ 𝐵, if and only if their joint 
probability equals the product of their probabilities, that is 𝑃(𝐴, 𝐵)  =  𝑃(𝐴)𝑃(𝐵). 
Equivalently, 𝐴 ⊥ 𝐵 if 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵)  =  𝑃(𝐴). Two variables A and B are conditionally independent 
given a third observed variable C if 𝑃(𝐴, 𝐵|𝐶)  =  𝑃(𝐴|𝐶)𝑃(𝐵|𝐶). In a probability distribution 
represented by a BN, some conditional independence relationships can be determined using 
the graphical criteria of d-separation [11]. Given a set of observed variables, variables that are 
not d-separated are said to be d-connected. 
Suppose that we have three variables A, B and C and we want to know whether the 
variables A and C are d-separated given the variable B. There are three types of connection as 
shown in Figure 1: 
- Serial connection (Figure 1a): A and C are d-separated, given that B is observed.  
- Diverging connection (Figure 1b): A and C are d-separated given that B is observed. 
- Converging connection (Figure 1c): A and C are d-separated only if the variable B or 
any of its descendants are not observed. 
 
Figure 1. (a) Serial connection. (b) Diverging connection. (c) Converging connection 
When variables A and C are d-separated, then the information from variable A does 
not flow to variable C and vice-versa. 
2.2 Markov Blanket 
The term Markov Blanket (MB) applied to BNs was first introduced by Judea Pearl in 1988 
[11]. The MB of a variable in a graphical model contains all the variables that can d-separate 
it from the rest of the network. In other words, the MB of a variable is the only knowledge 
needed to predict that variable and its children.  
 In BNs the MB of a variable A, denoted as MB(A), consists of its parents, children and 
children’s other parents as shown in Figure 2. The values of the parents and children of a 
variable evidently give information about that variable. However, its children's other parents 
also must be included, because they can be used to explain away the variable in question. 
 
Figure 2. The Markov Blanket of variable A in a Bayesian Network 
2.3 Explanation in Bayesian Networks 
The concept of ‘explanation’ has plagued philosophers. One stream of work [12], [13], [14], 
[15], [16] aims to find a hypothesis that best (in some specified sense) explains some observed 
facts. However, this ‘inference of the best explanation’ (IBE) is not our objective here. In this 
paper, we follow the classification of the focus of explanation methods in the context of BNs 
as proposed by Lacave and Diez [6]. According to them an explanation in the context of BNs 
can be focussed on any of the following objectives, the first of which corresponds to IBE:  
- Explanation of the evidence: ‘it consists of determining which values of the 
unobserved variables justify the available evidence. This process is usually called 
abduction, and it is based on the (usually implicit) assumption that there is a causal 
model’ [6]. 
- Explanation of the model: ‘it consists of displaying (verbally, graphically or in frames) 
the information contained in the knowledge base’ [6]. In other words, we explain how 
the structure and parameters of the model relate to domain knowledge [17]. 
- Explanation of reasoning: ‘it may provide three kinds of justification; (1) the results 
obtained by the system and the reasoning process that produced them, (2) the results 
not obtained by the system, despite the user’s expectations, (3) hypothetical 
reasoning’ [6].  
All the above types of explanation could be useful as part of decision support. 
However, as our aim is to increase the user’s trust in the model’s prediction, we wish to 
explain the model’s reasoning. This is the third in the list of possible focusses of an explanation 
in BNs. The form of such an explanation can be illustrated by the following scenario: 
A doctor uses a BN that predicts the likelihood of coagulopathy1 in 
traumatically injured patients. He enters the evidence and the model 
predicts that the patient is 8.7 times more likely to become coagulopathic 
than an average trauma patient. When asked to explain, the system 
informs him that, despite the positive effects of the absence of a long bone 
and pelvic fracture and a negative FAST scan2, the likelihood of 
coagulopathy increased because of haemothorax (blood in the chest) from 
rib fractures and lung injury, the high energy of the injury, a base excess3 
of -14, a Glasgow Coma Scale4 (GCS) of 4 and the administration of more 
than 500ml of fluids. In complicated cases, just explaining the significant 
positive and negative evidence may not be sufficient. The system can 
further explain that the evidence affected the prediction of coagulopathy 
through the unobserved variables tissue injury and tissue perfusion. 
This example shows the basic components of an explanation. First, the explanation 
has a statement that needs to be explained, we will refer to it as target. In this example, the 
target is the reported high odds that the patient is coagulopathic. Then evidence that supports 
or contradicts the reported statement is presented. Finally, additional information that is not 
directly observed but plays an important role in clinical reasoning is described.  
3. Related work on Explanation of Reasoning in a BN 
Several methods of explaining the reasoning in a BN have been proposed. Most of these 
methods include the following elements: i) measuring the impact of the evidence variables 
on the target, ii) determining a threshold for selecting the variables that should be included 
in the explanation, iii) distinguishing between supporting and conflicting evidence and iv) 
explaining the flow of information from evidence variables to the target, described as ‘chains 
of reasoning’. Our proposed explanation method is also based on these elements as it places 
the evidence at the core of the explanation, which is appropriate in a clinical decision support 
context. Several variants of this approach have been proposed. For instance, Yap et al. [17] 
shift the explanation entirely to the MB; this idea has been incorporated in our approach, but 
we use it alongside the evidence variables.  
 
1 Coagulopathy is a bleeding disorder, in which the blood's ability to coagulate (form clots) is 
impaired. 
2 FAST scan is a diagnostic test for internal intra-abdominal free fluid. 
3 Base excess is used as a sign of respiratory problems. 
4 GCS is a sign of consciousness. 
Other approaches for explaining the reasoning in BNs are quite different. In [18], Shih 
et al. create an explanation by analysing a classifier’s ‘decision function’, which can be 
understood as an exhaustive analysis of the cases giving a positive classification. A 
disadvantage of this approach for our purposes is that the explanation depends on the 
operating point of the classifier, whereas the output of a decision support system may vary 
smoothly with the posterior probabilities (e.g. using traffic lights) rather than using a single 
operating point. 
Another approach for explaining the reasoning in BNs is based on argumentation 
theory, widely used in legal cases. Arguments are extracting from a BN though an argument 
‘support graph’ [18], [19], [20], [21] from which an argument graph is extracted depending on 
the evidence. Although this representation has a history of application to the law, as far as we 
are aware it has not been widely applied in medicine.  
In the remainder of this section, explanation methods that cover some or all the elements 
introduced above are reviewed in detail. 
3.1 Evidence impact 
Not all the evidence has equal impact on the target variable. Measuring the impact involves 
assessing the change in the probability distribution of the target produced by the evidence; 
there are different distributions that can be compared and different measures to do that. The 
INSITE method, proposed by Suermondt [22], uses the KL divergence between the posterior 
of the target with all the evidence and the posterior of the target when each evidence (one-
way analysis) or a subset of evidence (multi-way analysis) has been temporarily removed. 
Exact multiway analysis for the best subset of evidence is time consuming as is exponential in 
the number of evidence variables. In addition, the KL divergence is ill-defined when the 
denominator is 0. Chajewska and Draper address the computational complexity with more 
flexible requirements for the size of the explanation set and the significance of the impact that 
each evidence variable has on the target [23]. They also point out that the prior probability of 
the target needs to be considered. BANTER [24] measures the difference between the prior 
and the posterior of the target for each evidence variable on its own. However, this 
simplification can be misleading sometimes as it neglects the rest of the available evidence 
variables. Madigan et al. assess the impact using Good's weights of evidence [25], evaluated 
incrementally as the user instantiates each evidence variable; a binary target is assumed, and 
the calculated weights depend on the order the evidence is entered [26]. 
3.2 Significance Threshold 
The explanation should only include the evidence variables with the greatest impact. Many 
ways have been proposed to find an appropriate impact threshold. A simple approach is for 
the end user to choose a threshold [23]. However, even if the end-user has the domain 
knowledge needed, it is hard for him to express this in terms of the range of the distance 
measurement. Alternatively, a fixed threshold is chosen by the model builder [24] or the 
impact of all the evidence variables is presented, from the largest to the smallest, without a 
threshold [27]. This can make the explanation very complex when there are many evidence 
variables. INSITE proposes an indirect way of specifying a significance threshold. Instead of 
choosing an appropriate threshold for the distance measurement, the user specifies an 
‘indifference’ range for the posterior of the target; changes outside this range are significant 
and the corresponding threshold can be calculated. This approach combines the users' 
domain knowledge, given as the range of indifference on the probability, and the 
characteristics of the distance measure. However, this range may need to be changed for each 
query and it is still not easy for the end user to do this, especially when the target variable is 
continuous, or the decision tool is being used under time pressure. 
3.3 Conflict Analysis 
We also want to know whether each evidence variable supports or conflicts with the overall 
change predicted by the model. INSITE introduced the idea of conflict analysis in an 
explanation, looking at whether removing an evidence variable shifts the posterior of the 
target in the same direction as the change from the posterior with all the evidence to the prior 
when all the evidence is removed. However, this analysis is limited to binary variables. For 
non-binary variables mixed effects can occur, where the change for some states supports, and 
for other states conflicts with, the overall change. Madigan's use of the weight of evidence 
distinguishes between positive and negative effects, but it may depend on the order evidence 
is entered. 
3.4 Chains of Reasoning 
Evidence variables may be connected to the target by other non-observed variables in a ‘chain 
of reasoning’. Choosing which of these variables to include in the explanation is difficult as 
there can be many such chains. INSITE generates a set of directed chains from each significant 
evidence variable to the target. Then it calculates the difference between the prior and 
posterior marginal distributions for each variable included in the chain. Based on a screening 
rule, a chain is eliminated if there is at least one variable for which there is no substantial 
difference (the difference is less than the threshold of significance as explained in Section 3.2). 
The elimination is because the variable acts as though it blocks the evidence transmission 
through the chain.  In the remaining chains, additional screening is performed by carefully 
removing arcs. By analysing the difference between the prior distributions of the target with 
and without the arc in comparison with the changes after the evidence transmission, the 
effect of the removed arc - and of the chains that include the arc - on the transmission from 
the evidence to the target  was derived. BANTER selects the chains with the highest strengths 
and the minimum length (among chains with the same strength) by measuring the impact of 
every variable in the chain. The strength of the chains is given by the minimum impact of any 
of the variables in the chain. Madigan et al. screen the evidence chains by looking at the 
weight of evidence of every variable in a chain of reasoning. The weight of evidence for each 
variable relates to the ratio between the weights of the incoming and outgoing evidence. 
However, they only consider networks with a tree structure, which have only a single path 
from an evidence variable to the target. Leersum tries to find a non-empty set of intermediate 
variables that summarizes all the information between the evidence and the target [28]. He 
looks at the weight of the edges using a Maximum-flow-minimum-cut theorem and then 
considers only the variables that are connected with the edges of the minimum cut, which is 
the minimum set of edges that makes the graph disconnected.  
4 Generating an Incremental Explanation of Reasoning 
This section presents the algorithm for producing an incremental explanation of reasoning in 
BNs. First, an overview of the overall algorithm and the levels of the explanation are 
introduced. Then the algorithm for each level of the explanation is described in detail.  
4.1 Overview 
In every scenario, we have a target variable T for which we compute the posterior 
probability distribution given a set of observed evidence E. There is also a set of 
unobserved intermediate evidence variables I that are part of the flow of reasoning from 
E to T. The variables that are included in the explanation are called the explanatory 
variables X. The set X consists of a set of significant evidence Esig, which are d-connected 
to T and have a significant impact on it (explained in detail in Section 4.2), and a set of 
important intermediate variables Isig that are unobserved (i.e. not evidence variables) and 
act as a middle step in the flow of information from Esig to T (explained in detail in Section 
4.3 and 4.4). The different sets of variables are shown in Figure 3. In case more than one 
T variables are available. Then an explanation for each of them is produced separately. 
 
Figure 3. Set of variables in the explanation of reasoning, with explanatory variables 𝑋 = 𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑔 ∪ 𝐸𝑠𝑖𝑔 
 As illustrated in Figure 4, the proposed explanation has three levels of increasing 
detail: 
1. Level 1 – Significant evidence variables: The first level lists the significant evidence 
variables Esig, ordered by their impact on T. The variables presented in this level are 
grouped into two clusters based on whether they support or conflict with the effect 
of the combined evidence. 
2. Level 2 – Information flow: The second level identifies the intermediate variables Isig 
through which the information from Esig to T flows and it shows how the evidence has 
changed the probability distribution of Isig. 
3. Level 3 – Significant evidence impact on the intermediate variables: The third level 
describes the impact of each member of Esig on each of the intermediate variables Isig 
supporting or conflicting with the combined effect. 
 
 
Figure 4. The process of the proposed explanation of reasoning 
4.2 Level 1: Significant Evidence Variables 
In the first level of the explanation, we try to answer the question ‘How does each evidence 
affect the target?’. Answering that question requires first a measure of impact, then a 
threshold of significance and finally an analysis of whether each evidence supports or conflicts 
with the overall change. 
4.2.1 Evidence Impact  
Following INSITE, the impact of an evidence variable Ei=ei relates to the distance between the 
posterior probability with all the evidence P(T|E) and the marginal posterior probability when 
ei is excluded from the set of evidence P(T|E\ei), which we denote as:  
 𝐼𝑚𝐸(𝑒𝑖) ≜ 𝐷(𝑃(𝑇|𝑬)||𝑃(𝑇|𝑬\𝑒𝑖)) (1) 
In case, we are interested about the distance between the posterior probability with 
all the evidence P(T|E) and the prior probability when the whole set of evidence is excluded 
P(T) = P(T|E\E), then equation (1) is defined as: 
𝐼𝑚𝐸(𝑬) ≜ 𝐷(𝑃(𝑇|𝑬)||𝑃(𝑇)) (2) 
INSITE uses the KL divergence as the distance metric. However, it is not always well 
defined. In our proposed method, the difference between the two distributions is measured 
using Hellinger distance (DH). For instance, given two discrete distributions P: {p1, … pn} and Q: 
{q1, … qn}, Hellinger distance is defined as: 
 
𝐷𝐻(𝑃, 𝑄) =  
1
√2







In case P and Q are continuous distributions, the square of the Hellinger distance 
between P and Q is defined as:  
𝐷𝐻2(𝑃, 𝑄) =  
1
2





Where √𝑑𝑃 and √𝑑𝑄  denote the square root of the densities. For instance, the Hellinger 
distance between the posterior and the prior distributions presented in Figure 5 is 
𝐷𝐻(𝑃(𝑇|𝐸 = 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒)||𝑃(𝑇))  =  0.42. The distributions presented in Figure 5 are generated 
following the dynamic discretization algorithm [29] available in AgenaRisk [30]. However, the 
same approach can be used in situations where the histogram of a distribution can be 
constructed from whatever underlying representation of the probability distribution is been 
used by the inference system.  
 
Figure 5. A two-node BN example, in which the posterior distribution of the target given E=False is superimposed 
against the prior distribution. 
Hellinger distance is symmetric, non-negative and it satisfies the triangle inequality. It ranges 
between 0 and 1. This distance metric was used for various reasons; (i) it can be calculated for 
both discrete and continuous distributions, (ii) it is u-shaped, (iii) it is always well defined. 
Having a distance metric that can be applied to both discrete and continuous distributions is 
fundamental, as nowadays more networks are ‘hybrid’. A u-shape metric gives a greater 
penalty to the distance from 0.9 to 0.91 than from 0.5 to 0.51. This is appropriate since a 
probability near either 0 or 1 represents near certainty. Finally, the distance metric should be 
defined for all the values of the two compared distributions. Other distance metrics that have 
these properties can be used as well.  
4.2.2 Significance Threshold  
The proposed approach for specifying the threshold of significance is an extension of the 
INSITE method. The challenge, introduced in Section 3.2, is to find an approach that applies in 
all cases. In the INSITE method, a sequence of definitions is made to achieve a parameter that 
defines significance and can also be interpreted by user. The user is then asked to select the 
value of this parameter. We wish to avoid this user input step, so we follow the same sequence 
of definitions but automate the final step using a simple heuristic.  
The first definition is a threshold 𝜃 for the impact of an evidence variable 𝑒𝑖. Specifically, 𝜃 is 
the minimum impact for evidence to be considered significant: 
 𝑒𝑖 ∈  𝐸𝑠𝑖𝑔 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐼𝑚𝐸(𝑒𝑖) ≥  𝜃 (5) 
Since it is not easy to set a single threshold 𝜃 for all cases, it is specified indirectly by first 
defining a marginal posterior probability G, which lies within the direction of change from 
𝑃(𝑇|𝑬) to 𝑃(𝑇), as shown in Figure 6, such as 𝜃 ≜ 𝐷𝐻(𝑃(𝑇|𝑬)||𝐺).  G is in turn determined 
by a parameter 𝛼, defining G as a proportion of the difference between 𝑃(𝑇|𝑬) and 𝑃(𝑇):  
𝐺 ≜ 𝑃(𝑇|𝑬) −  𝛼(𝑃(𝑇|𝑬) − 𝑃(𝑇)) (6) 
In INSITE, the user chooses 𝛼. To avoid the user input and make the generation of the 
explanation fully automatic, a predefined set of decreasing α: {α1 … αn} is introduced. Starting 
with the largest αi, each smaller value is tested until at least half of the evidence variables are 
included in Esig.  
 
Figure 6. Threshold of significance for a binary target T (based on Suermondt 1992) 
To illustrate this, imagine that we have a BN with a binary target T: {t1, t2} and a set E 
of 6 evidence variables E: {E1=e1 … E6=e6}. The prior, marginal posterior and posterior 
probabilities are: 𝑃(𝑡1) = 0.097;  𝑃(𝑡1|𝑬\𝑒1) = 0.19;  𝑃(𝑡1|𝑬\𝑒2) =  0.15;  𝑃(𝑡1|𝑬\𝑒3) =
0.27;  𝑃(𝑡1|𝑬\𝑒4) = 0.11;  𝑃(𝑡1|𝑬\𝑒5) = 0.21;  𝑃(𝑡1|𝑬\𝑒6) = 0.26;  𝑃(𝑡1|𝑬) = 0.2. Using 
the Hellinger distance, as defined in equation (3), the impact of each evidence (defined in 
equation (1)) is calculated. Then for a predefined set α: {0.5, 0.45, 0.4, 0.35, 0.3, 0.25, 0.2, 
0.15, 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.005, 0.001} a posterior distribution G is calculated following the rule 
defined in equation (6). For each G, a threshold 𝜃  is  calculated, such as 𝜃 ≜ 𝐷𝐻(𝑃(𝑇|𝑬)||𝐺). 
As shown in Figure 7, we have Esig: {e4, e3, e6} based on α = 0.5 and 𝜃 = 0.048. If, instead, the 
KL divergence is used, the set Esig and α remain the same but the threshold of significance 𝜃 
changes to 0.0042. Although in this example the same set of significant evidence was found 
in, the example illustrates the difficulty of defining a fixed  𝜃. In addition, 𝜃 also depends on 
the evidence as the same distance metric and the same α can lead to very different 𝜃 values 
in different scenarios.  
 
Figure 7. Impact of each evidence variable. The vertical red line shows the threshold 𝜃 = 0.48; evidence variables 
with an impact exceeding this threshold are considered significant. 
4.2.3 Conflict Analysis 
Having identified the set of significant evidence variables Esig, we next examine whether each 
evidence variable works in the same way in creating the overall change of T. This is known as 
‘conflict analysis’ and we extend INSITE’s method to work for variables with more than two 
states. When we perform a conflict analysis we compare (i) the direction of the change and 
(ii) the impact on the target when each evidence variable is removed with the impact when 
all the evidence variables are removed. The direction of change can be assessed using the 
difference ∆𝑡𝑖(𝑒𝑖)  for every state ti of T defined as: 
 ∆𝑡𝑖(𝑒𝑖)  = 𝑃(  𝑡𝑖|𝑬) − 𝑃(  𝑡𝑖|𝐸\𝑒𝑖)) (7) 
For each state ti, the difference ∆𝑡𝑖(𝑒𝑖)  is compared to the difference ∆𝑡𝑖(𝑬) =
𝑃(𝑡𝑖|𝑬) − 𝑃(𝑡𝑖) . If both differences have the same sign for each ti, then the direction of the 
change is consistent (Equations 8 and 10). If for each ti the sign of these distances is the 
opposite, then the direction is conflicting (Equations 9 and 11). Finally, when the sign of these 
differences is not the same or the opposite for each ti, then the direction is mixed (Equation 
12). Imagine, for instance that we have the target variable B: {b1, b2, b3} as shown in Figure 8. 
For the state b1, both differences have a consistent positive sign. Similarly, the differences for 
state b3 have a consistent negative sign. However, for state b2 the direction of change when 
we remove one evidence and when we remove all the evidence, is positive and negative, 
respectively. As a result, the direction of change is mixed. This gives the following definitions 
for the direction of change:  
 dconsistent(ei, 𝑡𝑖 ) = sgn(Δ𝑡𝑖(ei))  =  sgn(Δ𝑡𝑖(𝐄)) (8) 
   
 dconflicting(ei, 𝑡𝑖 i) = sgn(Δ𝑡𝑖(ei))  ≠  sgn (Δ𝑡𝑖(𝐄)) 
(9) 
   
  Dconsistent(ei) = ∀𝑡𝑖. dconsistent(ei, 𝑡𝑖i) (10) 
   
 Dconflicting(ei) = ∀𝑡𝑖. dconflicting(ei, 𝑡𝑖 ) (11) 
 
 Dmixed(ei) = ¬Dconsistent(ei) ∧ ¬Dconflicting(ei) (12) 
   
 
Figure 8. Example of a mixed direction of change  
The magnitude of the impact also needs to be considered. If all the evidence variables 
are working together, and the direction is consistent, the impact when one variable is 
unobserved is expected to be less than the impact when all the evidence variables are 
unobserved, such as ImE(ei) ≤ ImE(E). However, it is also possible that removing the evidence 
ei can lead to a greater impact than ImE(E), even though the direction is consistent. This 
suggests that ei ‘dominates’ the remaining evidence. In case the direction of change is mixed, 
we can assess which effect is more significant by comparing the impact of the consistent and 
the conflicting part. Suppose we have several states of T which 𝑡𝑖 ∈ dconsistent(ei, t𝑖). The 
impact of the consistent part is defined as ImE(ei)t𝑖 ≜ 𝐷(𝑃(𝑡𝑖|𝑬)||𝑃(𝑡𝑖|𝑬\𝑒𝑖)). Table 1 
summarises the conflict categories. 
Conflict Category Direction Impact 
Dominant Dconsistent ImE(ei) > ImE(𝐄) 
Consistent Dconsistent ImE(ei) ≤ ImE(𝐄) 
Conflicting Dconflicting n/a 
Mixed consistent Dmixed ImE(ei)t ∣ t ∈ dconsistent(ei, t)  > ImE(ei)t ∣ t ∈
dconflicting(ei, t) 
Mixed conflicting Dmixed ImE(ei)t ∣ t ∈ dconsistent(ei, t) ≤ ImE(ei)t ∣ t
∈ dconflicting(ei, t) 
Table 1. Summary of the conflict analysis categories 
4.3 Level 2: Information Flow 
The second level of the explanation uses a simple approach to present the flow of reasoning 
from each member of Esig to T. First, a set of intermediate variables Isig  is determined (Figure 
9). The MB(T) is chosen as the potential set of Isig. From the MB variables we include in Isig only 
those that are unobserved (Figure 9a, 9b) and part of a d-connected path from Esig to T, given 
the evidence variables E (Figure 9c). In the second level of the explanation, the change in the 
uncertainty of each member of Isig is also shown. If the set Isig is empty (e.g. all the MB variables 
are observed), the explanation stops at the first level. 
 
 
Figure 9. Process of finding the set of intermediate variables Isig. a) The variables A, C and J are observed. b) The 
variable C is observed, so it is excluded from the set of Isig. c) The variables B, E and G are not part of a d-connected 
part from the evidence to T, so they are excluded from the set Isig, which is {D, F}  
4.4 Level 3: Significant Evidence Impact on the Intermediate Variables 
The final level of the explanation repeats some parts of the analysis of level 1 on the 
intermediate variables of level 2. For simplicity and consistency, we do not reassess the set of 
Esig for each Isig. Instead, for each variable in Isig, we first determine the subset of Esig that are 
d-connected to them given E, and we carry out the conflict analysis as described before. 
5 Case Study 
The output of our explanation method is illustrated using a clinical case study on acute 
traumatic coagulopathy, a bleeding disorder in which the blood’s ability to clot is impaired.  
5.1 Detecting Coagulopathy 
The aim of the developed BN was to predict coagulopathy in the first 10 minutes of hospital 
care [31]. All the variables that may be observed within 10 minutes are shown in purple (Figure 
10). The target variable, COAGULOPATHY, is shown in red. There are 11 variables in the MB of 
the target. The variables PREHOSP and AGE are observed, so they are excluded from the set 
of Isig. In addition, the variables ROTEMA30 to APTTr (see top right) are not part of the flow of 
reasoning, while DEATH and HEAD are also not part of a d-connected path between the target 
and any of the evidence variables; this results in two intermediate variables: ISS (tissue Injury 
Severity Score) and PERFUSION (oxygen delivered to the tissues of the body). 
 
 
Figure 10. A BN model that predicts coagulopathy within 10 minutes of hospital care 
5.2 Verbal Output 
The output of our algorithm is verbal and consists of three main parts: (i) numerical data, (ii) 
fixed text and (iii) dynamic text. Numerical data are presented using numbers. Fixed text 
consists of standard phrases that can be repeated in different scenarios and are presented 
with small letters.  Dynamic text is different in every scenario and is shown with capital letters. 
At the beginning, the prediction of the target is presented. By default, the state with the 
highest probability is presented. If the user wants to know the output of a specific state, he 
can configure it. In this case study, clinicians were interested only in the likelihood of having 
coagulopathy. Then supporting and conflicting significant evidence variables are presented in 
a decreasing order based on their significance. We can have up to four groups of significant 
evidence: (i) consistent and dominant evidence, (ii) conflicting evidence, (ii) mixed consisting 
evidence and (iv) mixed conflicting evidence (see Table 1) 
The likelihood of COAGULOPATHY = YES is 11%. 
This patient has a 14% INCREASE in risk of becoming coagulopathic than an average trauma 
call patient. 
Factors that support the INCREASED risk of COAGULOPATHY = YES (strongest to least):  
• PREHOSPITAL FLUIDS ≥ 500mls (Very important)    
• GCS = 5    (Very important)  
• HAEMOTHORAX = YES  (Very important)  
• ENERGY OF INJURY = HIGH 
Factors that do not support the INCREASED risk of COAGULOPATHY = YES (strongest to 
least):  
• SYSTOLIC BLOOD PRESSURE = 168 
• LONG BONE FRACTURE = NO 
• LACTATE = 0.9  
 
Coagulopathy is a binary variable, so no mixed effects are present. The significant evidence 
variables are described as ‘supporting’ or ‘not supporting’. Supporting evidence is the 
consistent and dominant (distinguished by the phrase ‘Very important’) variables as described 
in Section 4.2.3. Non-supporting variables are those classed as conflicting in Section 4.2.3. In 
this scenario, where the patient has an increased risk of becoming coagulopathic, compared 
with the average trauma patient (prior), the supporting evidence increases the risk, while the 
non-supporting evidence decreases it. Then the intermediate variables and their change are 
presented. 
Important elements for predicting COAGULOPATHY are: 
1. PERFUSION: The likelihood of PERFUSION = NORMAL is 95% 
This patient has a 26% INCREASE in risk of having PERFUSION = NORMAL than an average 
trauma call patient. 
2. ISS: The likelihood of ISS = SEVERE is 49% 
This patient has a 230% INCREASE in risk of having ISS = SEVERE than an average trauma call 
patient. 
Level 2 shows how the intermediate variables Isig have been updated by the evidence. The 
likelihood of the state with the highest probability is presented. Again, the output of a specific 
state can be configured if needed. In the last level of the explanation we present the effect 
that the d-connected significant evidence variables have on each intermediate variable. 
 
Factors that support the INCREASED risk 
of PERFUSION = NORMAL:   
• SYSTOLIC BLOOD PRESSURE 
=168 
• LACTATE = 0.9 
• LONG BONE FRACTURE = NO 
Factors that partially support the 
INCREASED risk of PERFUSION = NORMAL:  
• NONE 
Factors that do not support the 
INCREASED risk of PERFUSION = NORMAL:   
• HAEMOTHORAX = YES 
Factors that partially do not support the 





Factors that support the INCREASED risk 
of ISS = SEVERE:   
• NONE 
Factors that partially support the 
INCREASED risk of ISS = SEVERE:  
• GCS = 5  
• HAEMOTHORAX = YES 
• ENERGY OF INJURY = HIGH 





Factors that do not support the 
INCREASED risk of ISS = SEVERE:   
• NONE 
Factors that partially do not support the 
INCREASED risk of ISS = SEVERE:  
• NONE
Level 3 shows the impact that the significant evidence variables have on the intermediate variables. 
Since PERFUSION and ISS have more than two states, mixed effects can occur and, are presented with 
the terms ‘partially support’ and ‘partially do not support’. 
6 Evaluation 
A small evaluation study was carried out with two aims: (i) compare the similarity between clinicians' 
reasoning and our explanation, (ii) examine the plausibility that the explanation can have a beneficial 
effect on clinical practice. The model presented in Section 5.1 was used as a case study. 
6.1 Study Design 
In this study, we presented 10 cases to 16 clinicians. A group of clinicians reviewed each case and 
selected only the cases that the model could correctly identify as true positives or true negatives. This 
was a before-after study organized into two parts. The first part helped us understand clinicians' 
reasoning and decision making. This was achieved by carrying out a baseline questionnaire for each 
case (160 responses). The second part assessed the potential benefit of the explanation. Each clinician 
completed a follow-up questionnaire; for half of the cases only the prediction of the model was 
presented (prediction cluster) and for the other half an extra explanation of the model's reasoning 
was given (explanation cluster) (Table 2). 
 Cases 
Clinicians Set X Set Y 
Group A Prediction Explanation 
Group B Explanation Prediction 
Table 2. Each group of clinicians saw half of the cases only with the model's prediction (prediction cluster) and the other half 
with an extra explanation of the model's reasoning process (explanation cluster). 
To control for biases, the cases in the two randomly created sets were matched pairwise based 
on their complexity. The same procedure was followed for the two random groups of consultants. 
Clinicians were matched in each group based on their expertise. Another factor that could cause bias 
was the order that each case was seen. For that reason, we presented the prediction or the 
explanation cluster randomly to each clinician. Thus, we prevented any influence in the response with 
the model's explanation by their previous experience with only the prediction of the model and vice-
versa. 
6.2 Questionnaire 
Each clinician completed a baseline and a follow-up questionnaire. In each questionnaire the following 
questions were asked: 
1. What is your initial impression of this case in relation to coagulopathy? 
2. Why? Rank the available information from most important to least important 
3. What would you do next? 
        On the follow-up questionnaires we also examined the potential benefit of the extra 
information. The baseline questions were repeated, and we asked additional questions that rated how 
the extra information increased their trust of the model's prediction and how useful and clear it was. 
6.3 Data Analysis 
The primary objectives were to assess: (i) similarity between clinicians' reasoning and the explanation 
(similarity) and (ii) increase in trust in the model given an explanation (trust). The secondary objectives 
were to assess: (i) potential benefit to the clinicians' assessment and decision making given an 
explanation (potential benefit) and (ii) clarity of the explanation (clarity). 
To assess the similarity, we investigated only whether the produced explanation contained all 
the evidence that clinicians mentioned as significant. As we restricted the set of significant evidence - 
evidence included in the explanation - with the intent to rapidly produce a concise explanation, and 
not necessarily the most complete one, our main intention was to investigate whether our produced 
concise explanation does not miss factors that clinicians considered significant and not whether extra 
variables are included in the explanation.     
We defined 4 groups based on the percentage of the variables that were considered as 
significant by clinicians and were also part of the provided explanation. Thus, their qualitative answers 
were categorised into the following groups: 
1. Not at all similar (clinicians’ reasoning is 0% similar to the explanation) 
2. Quite similar (clinicians’ reasoning is 1 - 49% similar to the explanation) 
3. Similar (clinicians’ reasoning is 50 - 74% similar to the explanation) 
4. Very similar (clinicians’ reasoning is ≥75% similar with the explanation) 
             Suppose that for a specific case, clinicians mentioned as significant the variables long bone 
fracture, unstable pelvis, FAST scan, Lactate and the first level of the explanation has mentioned as 
significant the variables unstable pelvis, Lactate, and GCS. As two out of the four variables mentioned 
by clinicians were also part of the explanation, the similarity belonged to group 3. As we focused on 
not missing any variable mentioned by the clinicians, negative weight was not given in cases where 
the explanation included more variables than those mentioned by clinicians. The aim was to compare 
how similar their reasoning was to our explanation based on the same available evidence. As a result, 
only clinicians’ reasoning in the baseline was examined.  
Clinicians’ trust in the model’s prediction between the prediction and the explanation cluster 
was compared, using their answers to the seven-point scale question: ‘How much would you say that 
you trust the prediction of the model?’. 
The analysis of the potential benefit was based on three questions. First, we compared their 
assessment of coagulopathy not only in the baseline and the follow-up but also in the prediction and 
the explanation cluster. Then, based only on the follow-up questionnaires, we examined how useful 
the model was. The usefulness was two-fold: (i) confirmation of their assessment and (ii) revision of 
their assessment. Finally, we compared their baseline and follow-up answers to the question ‘What 
would you do next?’ to examine whether the extra information had an impact on their decision-
making process. 
The clarity of the explanation was based on the final question of the explanation cluster ‘How 
clear was the explanation of the prediction of coagulopathy?’ and clinicians’ feedback. 
6.4 Results 
We present the results in each of the 4 categories: similarity, trust, potential benefit and clarity. 
6.4.1 Similarity 
To assess the similarity, we wanted to examine whether at least half of clinicians’ responses are similar 
to our explanation. Having 160 responses (10 clinicians reviewed independently 16 cases) and 
classifying as similar those responses that refer to categories 3 and 4, we found that 71% of clinicians’ 
responses were similar to our explanation. Based on a one-tail proportion test we had enough 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis and support our claim that clinicians’ reasoning was ≥50% 
similar to our explanation (p-value < 0.001). 
6.4.2 Trust 
We wanted to examine whether clinicians’ trust on the model’s prediction was significantly greater in 
the explanation than the prediction cluster. Each case was seen by a matched pair of clinicians (80 
responses); one clinician viewed only the model’s prediction (prediction cluster) and the other was 
also exposed to an explanation of the model’s reasoning (explanation cluster). Using the Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test we did not have enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis (p-
value = 0.82).  
6.4.3 Potential Benefit 
The first element of the potential benefit that we investigated was whether there was any significant 
difference in their assessment of coagulopathy between the baseline and the follow up questionnaire. 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test showed that we had enough evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis (p-value = 0.003) and support our claim.  
In addition, we examined whether, for the coagulopathic patients, clinicians’ assessment in 
the explanation cluster was greater than their assessment in the prediction cluster. Using the Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test we had enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis (p-value = 
0.048) and support our claim. Similarly, we tested whether clinicians’ assessment for the non-
coagulopathic patients was lower in the explanation cluster than the prediction cluster. We did not 
have enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis (p-value = 0.98). 
Clinicians answered a seven-point scale question: ‘How useful was the prediction of 
coagulopathy for confirming your assessment?’. We examined whether their rate of the model’s 
usefulness for confirming their assessment was greater in the explanation than the prediction cluster. 
Using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test we did not have enough evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis (p-value=0.36). The same analysis was conducted about the usefulness of the model 
in revising their assessment. Again, not enough evidence was available for rejecting the null hypothesis 
(p-value=0.81).  
Finally, the extra information had no impact on their decision-making process. In the baseline 
and the follow-up assessment their actions were the same.  
6.4.4 Clarity 
We wanted to examine whether at least half of the provided explanation was considered clear. Having 
80 responses (we used only the explanation cluster) and classifying as clear the explanations that were 
rated with 5,6 or 7, we found that 65.2% of the provided explanations were classified as clear by 
clinicians. Based on a one-tail proportion test we had enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
and support our claim (p-value = 0.01267). Finally, in the explanation cluster clinicians gave their 
feedback on the explanation in an open question. Some of their comments were: 
- In the heat of battle, a colour coded guidance would aid clarity 
- The words ‘partially support’ and ‘partially do not support’ are not very clear 
- Why haemothorax (HT) at the beginning was very important and at level 3 was partially 
supporting 
- Weighting leans towards more significant chance of coagulopathy 
- Lactate 4.5 is non-supportive, 4.6 would be supportive? 
- Level 1: useful brief explanation, level 3: too wordy 
- ATC reassuring when agrees with my prediction 
- Expected higher prediction 
7 Discussion 
As BNs become more complex, the difficulty of understanding the model's reasoning grows too. 
Decision models are built to improve decision making. Consequently, an explanation of how a model 
came to a prediction is an important part of model's use and trust. In this paper we have described an 
algorithm that generates an explanation in three levels, each adding more details to the explanation. 
Our method can be applied to BNs with both discrete and continuous variables and requires no user 
input. It is suitable for real-time use, as it focuses on rapidly producing a good explanation and not 
necessarily the most complete one. Our algorithm produces quick and concise explanations, but we 
recognize some limitations.  
One major limitation of our algorithm is the way we classify the evidence as influential. There 
are two quick approaches to identify the set of influential evidence: (i) observe each evidence variable 
in turn and compare the posterior probability with the prior (ii) remove each evidence variable in turn 
and compare the posterior with the posterior with all the evidence. Each approach focuses on a 
different type of influence, so each can miss detecting some influences under certain circumstances. 
Imagine that we have a binary target T: {True, False} and two evidence variables A: {True, 
False} and B: {True, False}, as shown in Figure 11.  Two scenarios are available; (1) the set of evidence 
is E: {A = True, B=True} and (2) the set of evidence is E: {A = False, B=True}. Suppose that in both 
scenarios our aim is to identify whether the evidence variable B is influential. Using approach (i) the 
impact of B is identified by comparing the posterior when B is instantiated P(T|B) with the prior P(T). 
Using the Hellinger distance 𝐷𝐻(𝑃(𝑇|𝐵)||𝑃(𝑇)), the impact of B is 0.14 in both scenarios. This 
approach cannot distinguish between the two different scenarios, as it neglects the complete set of 
evidence. On the contrary, using approach (ii) the impact of B is identified by comparing the posterior 
with all the evidence P(T|E) with the marginal posterior when B is temporally removed P(T|E\B). Using 
the Hellinger distance 𝐷𝐻(𝑃(𝑇|𝑬)||𝑃(𝑇|𝑬\𝐵)), the impact of B is 0.11 and 0.23, in scenarios (1) and 




Figure 11. A three-node BN 
Removing each evidence separately can distinguish different scenarios. However, there are 
situations, such as having AND or OR operator or mutually exclusive causes, where some influential 
evidence may be missed using approach (ii). For instance, imagine that T=True if both A and B are true 
(AND operator). In case E: {A = False, B=True}, using approach (ii) the impact of B is  
𝐷𝐻(𝑃(𝑇|𝑬)||𝑃(𝑇|𝑬\𝐵)) = 0. Therefore, when we have the AND operator and at least one parent is 
false, using approach (ii) we may miss some of the influential evidence. Similarly, when we have the 
OR operator and at least one parent is true. This problem becomes more important when we have 
more evidence. On the contrary, approach (i) gives a non-zero influence in both situations. 
A combination of the two approaches would be more appropriate under certain conditions. 
However, we chose to use approach (ii) and remove each evidence, as it is crucial to account for the 
rest of the available evidence. This is closer to the real world and the way people think about 
explanation. We removed one evidence at a time and not combinations of the evidence to reduce the 
time to produce the explanation. We accept the risk of missing interactions since the time needed to 
search for the best combination of evidence increases exponentially when the model and the number 
of evidence variables become bigger. In addition, for producing a concise and sufficient explanation, 
and not necessarily the most complete one, which is applicable in situations where there is a time 
pressure, no user input was required for selecting the set of significant evidence. This is a necessary 
restriction when time is of an essence, but we acknowledge that it makes the procedure inflexible.  
The MB of the target is used as the intermediate step to capture the flow of information from 
the evidence to the target. The advantages of using the MB are: (1) every variable in a BN has a MB, 
so it can be generalised, (2) the MB of a variable contains important information about it, and (3) it 
can be used to produce a meaningful explanation very quickly. However, in large BNs, where the 
evidence is further from the target, important variables along the chain will not be captured in the 
explanation. We could overcome this limitation by adding another explanation level, if needed, in 
which we present the MB of the MB variables. 
We also recognize the limitations of the evaluation study. Although based on a sound design, 
this study was based only on 10 real cases, so it cannot give definitive conclusions. It was used as an 
initial pilot study to investigate the potential benefits and shortcomings of the explanation, and to 
teach us useful lessons for a future larger trial. This study primarily looked at the similarity between 
clinicians’ reasoning and the generated explanation and at the increase in model’s trustworthiness. 
Secondarily, we examined the potential benefit of the explanation on clinicians’ decision making and 
assessment. Finally, the clarity of the explanation was tested. 
The explanation produced by our method was able to identify in most of the cases the majority 
of the evidence that clinicians mentioned as significant. As our aim was to assess whether our concise 
explanation did not miss the significant evidence identified by the clinicians, extra evidence that were 
part of the provided explanation was not considered as discrepancies between the explanation and 
clinicians reasoning. Clinicians trusted the model’s prediction, but there was no significant change in 
their trust when an explanation was provided. There was no impact on their decision making but there 
was a significant change in their assessment. However, there was not enough evidence to support the 
usefulness of the provided explanation in conforming or revising their assessment. The explanation 
was found to be clear but very wordy by most clinicians. They liked the first level of the explanation 
but found the third level of the explanation too complicated. They liked the idea of having an 
explanation but would prefer it to be less wordy and potentially graphically enhanced. 
Another limitation of the study was the chosen cases. Although they had a degree of ambiguity 
as coagulopathy is an uncertain condition, they were almost always similar with clinicians’ 
expectations. That might explain why the explanation did not have a significant impact on the model’s 
trust and clinicians’ decision making. Coagulopathy is a disease that takes time to develop. When a 
trauma patient arrives in the ED there are some standard actions that clinicians could carry out, such 
as examine the patient, give blood, go to theatre, conduct extra imaging etc. Having a justified 
prediction of coagulopathy can reassure their beliefs but it is not going to make them change their 
decisions. This was potentially the reason why the explanation did not have a significant impact on 
their decision making. In addition, the chosen clinicians were very experienced, so a decision tool and 
an explanation may have less significant benefit on their decision making than it would have on 
inexperienced clinicians. This can also justify the fact that they answered that the explanation was not 
very useful for confirming or revising their assessment, even if their assessment was significantly 
improved, especially for the coagulopathic patients. Finally, the length of the explanation could be an 
inhibiting factor. 
8 Conclusion 
We proposed a quick way to generate a concise explanation of reasoning for BNs that contain both 
discrete and continuous nodes, without any further input from the user. The small evaluation study 
showed that the explanation is meaningful and similar to clinicians reasoning. It does not have a 
significant impact on the model's trust and clinicians' decision making but it can affect clinicians’ 
assessment. Clinicians liked having an explanation, while they preferred it to be simpler and less word 
laden.  
To reduce the time to search for the best combination of evidence, only one item of evidence 
was removed at a time. This restriction may miss detecting some important evidence under certain 
circumstances. In addition, no user input was required for selecting the set of significant evidence, 
resulting in an explanation that is applicable in time critical situations but also in an inflexible 
approach. Furthermore, for saving time we only used the MB of the target as the intermediate step in 
the reasoning process. This can help us to generate a meaningful explanation quickly, but important 
information, especially in large BNs, might be missed. A useful next step is to investigate how we can 
prune the available evidence and intermediate variables, using the knowledge of the model’s structure 
and the domain knowledge. For instance, it would be useful to generate an explanation by making use 
of abstract semantics, such as idioms [32], [33]. In addition, the proposed method targets only BNs 
that are used as a one-time activity. A useful extension would be to investigate how our explanation 
can be extended to time-based BNs, where the explanation generated for a target in a later stage 
should distinguish between evidence entered in the same and in earlier stages. An investigation of the 
produced explanation in situations where multiple target variables are available would be informative. 
An enhanced graphical representation and an evaluation of the explanation in real time would help 
us to examine how much a decision maker makes use of the explanation under real conditions and 
potentially time pressure.  
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